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templation connected with that thinking. This thinking, moreover, is, in regard to its content, altogether the same.

2. If we take this thinking as connected with individuality, it is repeatable as many times as there are individuals, and is actually repeated so many times; but the content remains unchanged in all these repetitions.

3. Nevertheless there is a difference according to relation. For as each individual ascribes to itself a particular body, it necessarily posits this body in a particular location in space and in a location not occupied by other organized bodies. Now this location becomes for it necessarily the central point of its comprehension of the other objects in space, and of their order and position as related to itself. Hence there is for each individual a peculiar series of the existing objects of the universe.

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## THE FOUNDATION OF AUTHORITY IN THE STATE.

By H. H. MORGAN.

What right has the state to impose conditions and responsibilities? Of course, then, one must first ascertain what the state *is*. It will be remembered that among the colonies there were then forms of government: the provincial, the proprietary, and the charter. In the first, the king constituted the state, and, possessing all rightful authority, exercised it according to his pleasure; in the second, the proprietor stood in *loco regis*, with the same unlimited rights and responsibilities; under the third, powers more or less extensive, more or less absolute, were vested in those to whom the charter was granted—just as the rights and privileges of any corporation now vest in those to whom the charter is issued. Granting, then (for the moment), the original right of the king, the basis of state rights in each of the colonies will be clear. The king, the proprietor, and the grantees of the charter, could grant the rights of citizenship, just as any man can alienate his property. Thus under the charter governments (with which we are most interested as implying the other forms) the *state* meant the citizens collectively, and that the officers

of the state were only agents empowered to discharge the duties assigned to them by the state; that is, the state was the *organic* expression of the will of its citizens. What, then, is a citizen? A citizen is one who is allowed to have a voice in the state, one who is an integral part of the organism; the citizens collectively are the state, and each citizen is a necessary element of the state. To whom, then, does citizenship belong as a natural and inherent right? To nobody, because the rights of citizenship when alienated by the king vested in those to whom the alienation was made. The state, as far as its rights and privileges are concerned, is and must be a law unto itself, and, as it owns its own rights, may grant or withhold them as it pleases.

If this be true, why are not the decrees of the state arbitrary and tyrannical? If, as has been said, the state is the organic expression of the will of its citizens, its decrees are not arbitrary, because they express the rational (or reasonable) will of its constituent elements: one is by nature compelled to recognize the validity of his own rational will; therefore the citizen is obliged by the laws of his being, and not by arbitrary enactment, to recognize the state, which is but the expression of the common will.

It may be objected that we find unjust statutes, unwise legislation: how explain that what to-day we find rational, we shall next year disregard? Why should Missouri uphold slavery and then repudiate the institution? Because the reason of the world (which is but the generalization of the reason of the individuals who compose it) passes from plane to plane by steps—stumbles through the dark to the light.

To recapitulate: the state is the expression of the rational will of its members; its members are its citizens; its citizens are those who have acquired the right to be considered as integral parts of the organism; that the privileges of citizenship may be extended at the will of its citizens; that no one to whom such extension is not freely granted can have any valid claim to citizenship; and that the rational will of the citizens may from time to time undergo change without losing its specific character, just as change takes place in all organisms (and only in organisms).

Suppose, then, that one seems to have a broader view than

that expressed by the consciousness of the mass of the people. Suppose that to one the thought of universal suffrage is rational, while to the mass limited suffrage is still reasonable; how can any change be wrought? In those ways (and only in those ways) in which the state (that is, one's rational self) gives him prescribed means of expression. But, to take an extreme case, an enactment of the state is to me iniquitous; what should be my course? Try, by the use of prescribed modes, to effect a change. Why not resist the state? Because the state is one's rational self. But suppose that I think my view the more correct; still my thinking myself right does not make my thought true, and I should be opposing my individual idea of right to the ideas of all other persons, and should be opposing my own narrow experience to that of the whole community. Because I should, in effect, be saying: World, in four thousand years you have learned less than I know by intuition. World, I am the only honest, conscientious, intelligent person that has ever lived; I am the only wise man; I have a patent-right upon virtue and intelligence.

But suppose that my idea not only seems right, but is right. Then I may use my best efforts to demonstrate its reasonableness, and in proportion to its truth it will convert the national mind, just as the truth of freedom has converted those who were its opposers.

Still one may answer, these deductions follow if we grant your idea of the state. But what was its origin? Where did it originally get its power? Is not the state a compact? Did not man make it, and cannot man unmake it? Is it binding upon me who had no part in its institution—who, it may be, have no part in its action? The answer is that you must grant the validity of my idea of the state; it is the ignorance of this that forms the basis of false legislation and political error.

First, what reason have you for the assumption that the state is a compact? Can you, as evidence, point to the time and place? Can you find man in an isolated condition, feeling his weakness and therefore agreeing to form a state? Or can you show, from the *nature* of the state, that this assumption is demonstrably true? One or the other of these evi-

dences you must produce, or else you must admit your statement to be a baseless and unwarrantable assumption.

What then, you ask, is the state if it be not a manufacture, a device of man? I answer that it (as well as human society) is a *growth*. Do you now, in turn, demand the evidence? In reply, I ask you to test it by this thought, and see whether any phenomena remain unexplained. I answer furthermore, that whatsoever is a growth, and therefore organic, can be completed from any part that may be given, and that with this thought a knowledge of the laws of growth (laws which each organism has within itself and laws which are peculiar to each organism) one can construct the state, for the same reason and with the same certainty that a man of science can complete the fish if you give him but one of the scales. The very idea of an organism will show you that an organism, and nothing but an organism, will answer this condition. The evidence of origin in time and place, for the same reason, *cannot* be given. When Agassiz has determined the laws of growth in an animal, he is through; he *cannot* give you the laws of its creation. When the natural philosopher reduces motion to attraction or gravitation, he can state its laws, but he cannot go back and explain its origin. When the botanist has ascertained the laws of growth in any plant, he can cultivate it with success, but he cannot go back and tell us its origin; he cannot say why the one seed should produce the rose and another the thistle; he can only say such is the law of its growth, and this it must obey. Why can we not gratify this universal longing to know *why*, instead of *how*, God acts; why He should prescribe one mode of growth rather than another? Because we are stating a contradiction, and Divinity itself cannot realize a contradiction. What is this contradiction? The proposition to go *back of* the beginning. But the beginning is the initial point; nothing, therefore, can exist prior to the beginning.

A state, therefore, is and must be a law unto itself, because every organism must follow its own laws of growth: we for our part can learn to comprehend the laws of growth, but can only control them by obeying, and can never get behind them. Now let this test be applied where you will, and let its validity be determined by the results which you obtain.

A few words only in exemplification. Why is there so much foolish legislation? Because legislators, being human, mistake their own views for the voice of the universally rational element of mankind. Because, not knowing that society is a *growth*, they try to substitute the work of individual man. Legislators, for example, have tried to destroy intemperance by legislative enactment, and the futility of their efforts is conclusive evidence of the unfitness of their means. Men may even *seem* to carry their points—may, as a legislative body, do unwise or unjust acts,—and yet, because the state is a growth (and it seems to me that no other view will explain this), their acts fall dead. Legislatures have decided it rational to hang him who steals a horse, but the law is inoperative; legislatures have proscribed intemperance, but the evil has not been destroyed. On the other hand, human wilfulness or human malice may try to destroy the state, but the effort is vain, for it, like Christianity and all truth, lives on in spite of foolish zealots or stupid malignants.

The state, like the plant, cannot prevent our giving it what it does not need for its perpetuation, but it will *assimilate* only what its laws of growth require; it will appropriate all that is truly rational, and repel the vain efforts of individual man to infix his whims and crudities.

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## PHILOSOPHEMES.

By A. BRONSON ALCOTT.

*Genesis.*

Desire is the live spark of our immortality, all delights being seminal, spirit in tranfusion, and bodies in embryo.

The Procreant instincts out of spirit's chaste seat,  
Peopling Cosmos from Chaos in fashion complete.

The Incarnation were not without sex, nor were "either sex alone but half itself." Hereby the One defends and embodies his Personality, returning into his Godhead while peopling matter with his image and intelligence. And this the ancient wise men obscurely signified in those mysteries wherein they represented the virile Hermes as the ideal Reason generating the visible world. The genesis is spiritual; creation a descent and degradation: the spirit stooping to